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1 Introduction 
Most research on non-human animals (hereinafter referred to as animals) in­
volves clear harms for the animals used, either as a direct result of research 
protocols or by virtue of the conditions under which the animals are kept. Ar­
guably, however, although these harms are widely acknowledged, they have 
not motivated significant change to the practice of animal research. In this 
chapter, we focus on the damage to humans that can result from animal ex­
perimentation and how this may act as an alternative driver of change. 
Humans employed in animal research, whether inside animal housing or 
the laboratory, confront significant stress as a result of what they routinely do 
as part of their job, as well as by virtue of how that work is received by "outsid­
ers" to animal research. These workplace stressors can result in physical and 
psychological harms. It is well known that human patients may also be harmed 
as a consequence of the epistemological shortcomings of research undertaken 
on animals, which fails to translate to human clinical settings. Whilst we will 
briefly discuss these kinds of physical and psychological harms, our primary 
focus is the moral injury that can result from the practice of animal research. 
Moral injury occurs when a disregard of someone's well-being causes them 
harm. Typically, this is understood to encompass the kind of moral wrong that 
may arise from systematic injustices or from criminal or violent acts. However, 
moral injury is increasingly recognized as a problem for the perpetrators as 
well as the victims of certain acts. Moral injury, thus, also occurs when a person 
© JANE JOHNSON AND ANNA SMAJDOR, 2019 I DOI:10.1163/9789004391192_014 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of th�ffrXA1W�'iir/3.1r;-8'1cir'1b<iirMieJ���H� �-'9o-04_39119_2 
of publication. Downloaded from Brill.com11 /11 /2019 09:57:0SPM 
via free access 
306 JOHNSON AND SMAJDOR 
is complicit in activities that they feel are morally wrong or transgressive. Mor­
al injury as a phenomenon, in this sense, is well established in military situa­
tions, where personnel may undertake or witness actions that would be illegal 
or immoral in other settings. 
Using arguments derived from the work of Axel Honneth (2006), we show 
that animal research involves an institutionalized failure to recognize non­
human animals that not only reifies animals but the human persons engaged 
in this process, diminishing the scope of their moral agency and causing moral 
injury. In this chapter, we begin by briefly articulating the harms to animals in 
research and the more conventional harms to humans that can arise as a result 
of animal research, before making a case for the ethical damage wrought by 
the failures of recognition inherent within the system of animal research. We 
conclude with a brief outline of our approach as a means of effecting change 
in animal research. 
2 Harms to Animals in Research 
It is widely acknowledged that animals frequently suffer harms when used in 
interventional biomedical research directed at human clinical benefit. These 
harms may be the direct result of research protocols or relate to the conditions 
in which animals are housed. Animals can experience pain and discomfort 
when used in toxicology testing, the development of pharmaceuticals, vaccine 
development, diagnostic techniques, and surgical research. The intervention 
itself may be the source of distress, or, if the research protocol demands it, 
prior infliction of an alien disease or condition on the animal may be a source 
of suffering. Animals used in biomedical research are routinely killed at the 
completion of a protocol or series of protocols. Although arguments can be 
made that, in itself death may not amount to a harm for non-humans, the 
manner in which animals are killed can be a source of concern, and there is 
disagreement over what constitutes humane euthanasia (Hawkins et al., 2016 ). 
Housing can be another source of harm for animals in research, since the en­
vironment in which animals are kept may negatively impact their well-being. 
Housing that is inexpensive, easy to handle, and clean may not provide the 
best environment to meet the needs of animals. Animals may be harmed by 
lack of access to conspecifics and adequate stimulation, the intrusion of light 
and noise, inappropriate cage design, and so on (National Health and Medical 
Research Council, 2013). Although most of these harms are well known, argu­
ably, they have not motivated significant change in the practice of research. 
For the remainder of this chapter, we focus instead on harms to humans from 
animal research, which have received relatively little attention. 
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For some time, it has been acknowledged that there are epistemological prob­
lems in translating results obtained from animal experiments into human 
clinical benefit. A number of reasons can be cited for this failure, including, 
differences in physiology and metabolism between human and non-human 
animals (LaFollette and Shanks, 1996); poorly conducted and inappropriately 
evaluated animal experiments (Perel et al., 2007; Pound et al., 2004); and ani­
mal stress due to many of the environmental factors identified above ( e.g. small 
cage size, boredom, high levels of noise, etc.), which in tum has impact on 
physiology and the reliability of scientific data obtained from animals (Akhtar, 
Pippin and Sandusky, 2008; Baldwin, Primeau and Johnson, 2006; Burwell and 
Baldwin, 2006; also see in this Volume: Herrmann, 2019;Jayne and See, 2019). 
Irrespective of the reasons behind failures in translation, the consequences 
are significant for human patients and those who work with animals. First, pa­
tients may receive treatment that is inappropriate and harmful, if such treat­
ments have "passed" animal testing but remain dangerous to humans (Pound 
and Bracken, 2014 ). In these cases outcomes may include a heightened risk of 
morbidity or mortality. There are also opportunity costs associated with pur­
suing one form of intervention rather than another. Second, patients may not 
receive treatments that could be beneficial, if they have "failed" animal tests, 
i.e. the development of potentially fruitful interventions for humans may be 
cut short by unsuccessful animal trials (Pound and Bracken, 2014). In addition, 
research findings in animals, which have no validity for humans, can lead to 
the misdirection of future financial resources and research efforts (Pound and 
Bracken, 2014). The resources of funders, researchers, and human trial partici­
pants may be effectively wasted in pursuit of what amounts to futile lines of 
inquiry. These resources would be better spent on different treatments or dif­
ferent forms of research, such as clinical trials, epidemiological studies, and 
computer modelling, rather than on animal research. 
Those who work in animal research are also at risk of harm. Exposure to 
workplace stressors is associated with a range of negative outcomes (Britt 
et al., 2016). People who are directly involved with animal research, whether 
inside animal housing or the laboratory, face challenging issues in relation to 
the animals in their care. These workers may witness or directly cause animals 
to experience discomfort, pain, and suffering as part of an experimental pro­
tocol. They may be required to infect animals with a disease, or impair their 
function in some way, or euthanize them at the completion of the experimen­
tal protocol. Research workers can experience a range of negative feelings 
and health impacts (physiological, psychological, and social) as a result of 
their involvement in research. During their work, some may experience guilt, 
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uneasiness, or frustration, as well as grief at the death of an animal in their care 
(American Association for Laboratory Animal Science, 2003). The culture of 
secrecy that cloaks much animal research limits discussion of these challenges 
by workers, exacerbating the problems experienced. 
For those who work as animal carers or as laboratory technicians, these 
difficulties may be particularly pressing. Those who are employed to look af­
ter animals, rather than carry out the research per se, have frequently chosen 
their careers based on a love of animals; as such, they experience the harms 
to animals in research as especially distressing (Birke, Arluke and Michael, 
2007 ). Furthermore, these individuals may not have been routinized to animal 
research in the same way as those who have trained as researchers, so they may 
lack the coping mechanisms that may assist in addressing these issues (Birke, 
Arluke and Michael, 2007). There is limited discussion of these harms in the lit­
erature. In the remainder of this chapter, we focus on an even more neglected 
area of harm to humans involved in animal research, namely, moral harm. 
4 Harms to Humans - Moral 
In order to make effective use of animals in research, those who work with 
them must, to some extent, treat them as objects: objects of scientific inter­
est. In order to do this, the subjectivity of the animal is disregarded or denied. 
Its value comes not from what is intrinsic to it but from what others deem to 
be useful. The animal is controlled, monitored, manipulated, and measured in 
ways that, as we have suggested, often cause harm. This is not the same as, for 
example, deliberate cruelty, sadism, or vindictiveness. The intention is not usu­
ally to cause suffering but to achieve some other goal, for which the animal's 
suffering is a necessary prerequisite or side effect. The animal is merely a means 
to a scientific end, and those who are involved in the research must ensure that 
they are able to view animals in this narrow way and treat them accordingly. 
The treatment of human beings as objects or as mere means to scientific 
ends is uncontroversially regarded as morally problematic. The validity of the 
animal model aside, whether it is morally wrong to use animals in this way 
depends partly on what moral theory one subscribes to. Most of those who 
find it acceptable to use animals for research base their reasoning on the idea 
that animals have a different moral status from human beings. Accordingly, 
much of the debate about animal rights has revolved around the question of 
what capacities are necessary or sufficient for full moral status, and whether 
animals have these capacities (Bastian et al., 2012; DeGrazia, 1996; Singer, 2013). 
However, we suggest that there are moral problems associated with the use of 
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animals in research, regardless of their moral status. This is because, in order 
to make use of them, we have to adopt a particular stance towards them that 
requires a subjugation or diminution of our own moral agency. We can choose 
to treat animals as subjects or as objects for our use. When we choose the lat­
ter option, we reify them. Reification is a term with a complex political and 
philosophical history. For the purposes of our discussion, we build primarily 
on Honneth's use of the term (2006). 
5 What Is Reification and How Does It Relate to Other Moral 
Concepts? 
Reification is a disposition or a mode of relating to others that can be a prod­
uct of systems and institutions that compel people to behave in certain ways, 
to treat others as mere things. It is, as Axel Honneth (2006) puts it, a social 
pathology (p. 92 ). The concept of reification has some resonance with Kant's 
formula of humanity. Kant insists that we should never treat other human 
beings as mere means to our own ends, but always as ends in themselves. 
Reification also has some resonance with the concepts of commodification, 
objectification and inattention. Elisabeth Anderson (1990 ), for example, dis­
cusses the commodification of women's labor in surrogacy. Commodification 
is bad, she says, because it is mistaken. We fail to value the commodified 
person and this is an error. The woman is inappropriately used - treated 
as a thing - rather than respected. Anderson's view suggests that there are 
fixed moral categories, and that we sometimes make mistakes in determining 
how to categorize others. This implies that commodification is not intrinsi­
cally wrong, only when we commodify the wrong entity. This is what occurs 
in surrogacy, according to Anderson, whereas she may not think it wrong to 
commodify animals used in research. We employ Honneth's (2006) approach 
to argue a broader and more agnostic view. Given that we are sometimes 
uncertain of how to respond to others, and we know that we are fallible and 
self-interested, to cultivate a commodifying disposition may be intrinsically, 
morally problematic. 
Reification has similarities with what Kathie Jenni calls, vices of inattention 
(2003).Jenni argues that it is through inattention that people who are horrified 
when they know about factory farming, nevertheless, eat meat and try to avoid 
thinking about the horrors involved in its production. Similar claims may be 
made with regard to our reluctance to think about or discuss animal research. 
Again, this suggests a specifically epistemological kind of problem: we lack 
knowledge because we choose to look away instead of properly observing. 
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In Anderson's (1990) account too, we make an epistemological mistake in mis­
categorizing certain others. However, focusing on accidents, lack of attention, 
and epistemological mistakes does not adequately capture the very deliberate 
aspects of what occurs in animal research. It is for this reason that we find 
reification a more compelling descriptor of the situation. 
What is involved in animal research is not accidental. Indeed, reification 
goes hand in hand with a very specific form of attention, certainly in science. 
It is a reifying attention that denies not only the non-thing-ness of the ob­
ject of research, but also the moral agency of the researcher, since the moral 
relationship between researcher and research object is fixed by institutional 
and external factors. The researcher cannot choose to relate to the animal as a 
non-thing, at least not without sacrificing the scientific mantle. 
In developing his understanding of reification, Honneth (2006) discusses 
Lukacs' view of a world where caring has been subverted and replaced with 
a pathological tendency towards reification (Lukacs, 1971). Honneth rejects 
the concept of care as the counterpart of reification, in favor of the term rec­
ognition. The phenomenon of reification and the means of addressing it are 
central to our purposes, as we examine the ways in which animals are used in 
research. Reification, according to Axel Honneth, is a deadening tendency that 
distorts our ability to relate to the world around us. "[T]he subject is no longer 
empathetically engaged in interaction with its surroundings but is instead 
placed in the perspective of a neutral observer, psychically and existentially 
untouched by its surroundings" (2006, pp. 98-99). 
Reification is not inherent in specific actions but in a conjunction of the 
action and disposition/intention. For this reason, there is no single means 
by which we can point at a class of actions and say they are always wrong. 
However, as we have suggested, it seems fairly clear that the scientific gaze is 
likely to be a reifying one, even before any action has been taken. Indeed, doing 
nothing can be compatible with reifying, if the reason for doing nothing is that 
one regards the entity that is being ignored as a mere thing; for example, if one 
fails to rescue an animal from a burning building. 
It should be clear from our discussion so far that reification is deeply risky 
for those who are reified. Whether human or animal, their interests, suffering, 
and subjectivity are likely to go unnoticed or to be systematically devalued. 
But the moral problems stemming from reification are not limited, specifically, 
to the harm that it may cause to those who are reified. This is of particular 
importance to our analysis of the human harms engendered through animal 
research. Many people believe that provided certain standards of welfare are 
met, and research protocols are subjected to ethical review, animal research is 
not in itself unethical. However, animals remain research objects, and their life 
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and well-being are precarious, since at the discretion of the researcher, they 
may be harmed or euthanized. Indeed, one of the clearest indications that re­
search animals are reified is the fact that, once their value to an experiment is 
over, they are generally terminated. Animals will usually fight to preserve their 
existence; but the intrinsic value of an animal's life to the animal itself is not 
sufficient, in the research context, to allow it to live. We suggest that animal 
research will remain morally problematic even if issues of welfare continue to 
be improved, precisely because the harm suffered by research animals is only 
a subset of the problem. As long as research involves the reification of other 
animals, it will cause moral difficulties for those engaged in this research. It 
is here that the concept of reification is particularly significant in helping us 
move away from limited questions concerning the capacities or moral status 
of animals. From Honneth's perspective, this is irrelevant in at least one impor­
tant sense. "The things we encounter in our everyday dealings with the world 
must also be regarded as entities to which we relate in an inappropriate way 
when we apprehend them merely neutrally and according to external criteria" 
( 2006, p. 132 ). 
6 Reification and Moral Injury 
We have outlined the ways in which animal research involves the reification 
of animals. However, a key part of our argument is that this, in turn, impacts 
the people responsible for working with such animals. Reification, aside from 
anything else, is a diminution, denial, or abrogation of moral agency. This can 
work in two ways. First, the reifier denies that the entity in question is anything 
other than a thing. Second, the very process of reification reflects back on the 
moral agent. The person, who has the capacity to be a moral agent, comes to 
feel and act as though this were not the case through reifying both their own 
moral agency and the entities that they encounter. 
This kind of situation may lead individuals into difficulties regarding wheth­
er to continue to do work they find troubling. For example, some of those who 
work in the animal house and as laboratory technicians construe themselves as 
a type of intermediary between scientific researchers and animals, advocating 
and protecting the latter (Birke, Arluke and Michael, 2007 ). This sets up a kind 
of cognitive dissonance, which can be exacerbated by pressure from within the 
organization. For example, informal advice to management from the Ameri­
can Association for Laboratory Animal Science (2003) suggests supervisors 
remind workers that "if they cannot perform an assigned task, someone else 
will be required to do so" (p. 3). This means that individuals who care for the 
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animals they work with, and who have built a rapport with them, can become 
caught in a cycle whereby they feel personally obliged and institutionally pres­
sured to persevere with this work in spite of the personal cost. 
Staff who do care about the animals they work with are themselves be­
ing reified by systemic and institutional pressures. The moral agency that 
enables them to relate to the animal, to have a view as to how and whether 
something should be done, may be stultified over time. Habermas also iden­
tifies this problem - that of our capacity to reify ourselves - calling it the 
"self-instrumentalization of the species" (2014). While Habermas was not con­
cerned with animal research, he, nevertheless, offers a clear illustration of the 
phenomenon he was concerned with. In seeking to instrumentalize other spe­
cies, we simultaneously do the same to ourselves. 
7 Loss of Moral Agency Leads to Moral Injury 
The use of animals in research requires a narrowing of the social sphere, to ex­
clude some entities or to limit the ways in which the interests of these entities 
can serve to restrict our freedoms to act on them. In this way, moral agency is 
constrained. In addition, the nature of scientific work often means that people 
carry out procedures that have been defined and required by others, so that 
moral implications, in relation to animals, may be doubly removed from the 
individual's own sense of moral autonomy or agency. There are some parallels 
here with the known problem of desensitization: those who cannot success­
fully desensitize themselves to animal suffering are unlikely to thrive in jobs 
that require animal research. Therefore there is an inbuilt incentive for scien­
tists and researchers to seek to desensitize themselves actively, by reframing 
their moral relationship with the animals (Capaldo, 2004). 
We hypothesize that habitually narrowing the scope of moral concern is a 
source of moral injury to those who do it. Institutions and workplaces often 
require this kind of narrowing. For example, to promote efficiencies, effort is 
expended on an ever-smaller circle of those who matter. Thus, workers may 
find themselves told to ignore the mold on the tomatoes in the burgers, or to 
give parents misleading feedback on their children's reports, or to prioritize 
the management's targets above any other concern they have relating to the 
patient (Smajdor, 2013). There are many areas of modern life, maybe even most 
workplaces, where the demands of efficiency are such that reification seems 
inescapable. To this extent, the situation of those involved in animal research 
may not be significantly different from those working in factories or universi­
ties or engaged in other sorts of scientific or laboratory work. However, there 
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is an important additional factor that feeds into the mix here. There are some 
people whose occupations also involve intensely, ethically-charged decisions 
or practices. These include those working as military personnel, medical pro­
fessionals, and - we would argue - those involved in animal research. 
The damaging effects of breaking strong moral taboos have previously been 
discussed in the context of military and medical personnel. For example, both 
medics and military personnel are more likely to witness, bring about, or be 
involved in the death of other human beings. Both are required to perform ac­
tions that cause harm to other individuals. Both may have to overcome feelings 
of repugnance for what they do and to attempt to distance themselves from 
normal human responses (Howe, Smajdor and Stocki, 2012; Smajdor, Salter and 
Stocki, 2010 ). For these reasons and others, medical and military personnel are 
at risk of moral injury (Litz et al., 2009; Steenkamp et al., 2011 ), and a variety 
of strategies have been developed in order to encourage institutions and indi­
viduals to identify these risks and deal with them. It may not be immediately 
obvious that one can draw parallels between animal researchers and soldiers 
or medics; but, in fact, proximity with death and witnessing or causing trauma 
is likely to be part of all of these worlds, as is the need to function within highly 
complex and hierarchical systems. These systems impose their own moral 
demands and codes, which frequently conflict with the norms and expecta­
tions of society. In these circumstances, a combination of strong social taboo 
attached to the activity, reification, loss of agency, and the ethical complexity 
of the role lends itself to a far higher risk of moral injury. 
It is routinely accepted in modem societies that killing and harming ani­
mals is prima facie wrong. Indeed, to participate in activities such as these 
is usually against the law and/or regarded as immoral, unless carried out by 
designated people. Even, or especially, in developed Western societies, whose 
farming practices and research activities require that animals are used, killed, 
or harmed, members of the public are not commonly involved in these prac­
tices. What this means is that, just as doctors or members of the military are 
engaged in breaking taboos, so too are people whose roles involve using or 
harming animals. Animal researchers must contain their "normal" feelings, to 
some extent, and refrain from "normal" moral and social judgements just as 
soldiers do. Shifting between different moral contexts can, in itself, be a risk 
for moral injury. The switch from war to civilian life is well recognized as a 
source of stress, and this shift is one that animal researchers may undergo on 
a lesser scale every day. In some senses, animal research is even more morally 
taboo than military service. Soldiers can be, and often are, viewed as heroes. In 
the contemporary environment, it is hard to envisage the same possibility for 
animal researchers (Birke, Arluke and Michael, 2007, however, note that some 
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pro-research campaigns seek to cast researchers as heroes for saving patients, 
especially children). Furthermore, soldiers are often regarded as paradigmatic 
examples of powerful, attractive men. It is not generally thought shameful to 
be a soldier. Nor would one expect to have to keep this secret. Yet, away from 
their colleagues, some animal researchers might feel shame, social stigma, and 
exclusion based on what they do. As a result, they may feel impelled to keep the 
nature of their work secret. Again, this taboo bears particularly on laboratory 
technicians as opposed to researchers, since for the former group working with 
animals in research constitutes the entirety of their role (Birke et al., 2007 ). 
Aside from the elements of cognitive dissonance or shame attached to ani­
mal research, which is perhaps a result of its problematic moral status in so­
ciety, moral injury may arise in this context from a more direct and personal 
feeling of being involved in wrongdoing. Again, this has parallels with military 
situations. Moral injury can result from witnessing or being complicit in acts 
that one feels to be wrong. One does not have to be a perpetrator of the act 
in question in order to be damaged by it. A sense of helplessness, or percep­
tion of being disempowered by the structures and systems within which one 
works, can lead to situations where one's moral agency comes under threat. 
Over time, this leads to a gradual hardening, or dissociation, as individuals 
try to protect themselves from the sense of wrongdoing and become passive 
and disempowered. If this dissociation is effective, a person may cease to feel 
distress but may, nevertheless, continue to be damaged physiologically and 
psychologically (Kammeyer-Mueller, Simon and Rich, 2010; Litz et al., 2009). 
8 Addressing the Problem of Reification 
Several strategies and remedies could be devised to limit or ameliorate reifi­
cation and its associated moral harms in the context of animal experimenta­
tion. For example, universities, hospitals, and other institutions where animal 
research takes place could better acknowledge the kind of stresses and pres­
sures placed on their workers and implement policies to support resilience, 
perhaps akin to those adopted in the military setting. Although this may help 
workers cope with the issues they confront (which is not insignificant), it does 
not seem to get to the heart of the problem, namely, that biomedical research 
requires the reification of animals and, in tum, the humans who work with 
them. Another strategy may be to radically transform the practice of research 
in such a way that the harms to animals are minimized and their intrinsic val­
ue and subjectivity acknowledged. This could be facilitated by adopting the 
animals-as-patients model argued for elsewhere (Johnson and Degeling, 2012 ). 
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Animal patients shift the balance of harms to benefits for animals in research 
and address some of the epistemological worries about the failure of animal 
research to translate into human clinical benefit. A move towards regarding 
animals as patients could represent one point along the way to a paradigm 
shift in animal research. This, if successful, would radically alter the relation­
ship between researchers and participants. It would no longer be necessary for 
researchers to distance themselves from the animals' suffering, and, as with 
research involving humans, the moral value of the research participant would 
be an inbuilt aspect of the process. 
It seems to us that, as with other major social shifts on complex issues, there 
will not be a single knock down argument or historical, political, or economic 
circumstance that will provoke change in animal research. Rather, change will 
occur when a number of arguments and factors come together that all sup­
port a new direction. We hope to have shown that there is a new argument 
that can be mounted against animal research, one that is grounded in an 
acknowledgement of the moral harms to humans that can result from involve­
ment in animal experimentation. Contributing an argument that appeals to 
human self-interest and does not depend on problematic attempts to establish 
the moral status of animals or on reducing animals to their welfare, is, we hope, 
promising and able to further gird a move away from the current, deeply prob­
lematic, practice of animal research. 
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